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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the District Court's 
pre-trial denial of the Appellants' claims to absolute and 
qualified immunity from suit. Although the District Court 
did not expressly address the Appellants' immunity claims, 
it denied the motions for summary judgment in which 
those claims were asserted. We hold that this implicit 
denial of the Appellants' immunity claims is sufficient to 
confer appellate jurisdiction. We will affirm. 
 
I. Facts and Procedure 
 
In July 1994, Montgomery County's Salary Board 
promoted Robert Wright to Director of the County's 
Department of Housing Services. At the time, Wright had 
been a County employee for approximately 15 years, 
working first for its Redevelopment Authority, and then for 
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the Department of Housing Services. Beginning in 1993, a 
number of Montgomery County homeowners contacted the 
United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development to lodge complaints against Montgomery 
County's Department of Housing Services. The complaints 
accused Department officials of mismanagement, negligence 
and undue delay in their administration of the County's 
HUD-funded Home Improvement Program. The complaints 
specifically mentioned Wright by name, as well as other 
Department employees and contractors. HUD forwarded the 
complaints to the County's Board of Commissioners and, 
ultimately, initiated an audit of the Department. 
 
Beginning in December 1995, HUD forwarded a series of 
draft audit findings to Wright in his capacity as Department 
Director. The draft findings identified a number of 
deficiencies in the Department's administration of HUD- 
funded programs. In addition to more general shortfalls, the 
draft findings concluded that Wright, among others, had 
engaged in a number of transactions with HUD contractors 
involving impermissible conflicts of interest. HUD forwarded 
its final draft finding on April 19, 1996. 
 
On April 22, the Salary Board voted to suspend Wright, 
who is African-American, without pay.1  On May 20, HUD 
issued its final audit report which, like the draft findings, 
was highly critical of Wright's management of the 
Department, and of his personal dealings with HUD 
contractors. On June 13, the Salary Board voted to 
terminate Wright's employment. Two other Department 
employees, both of whom were white, were also terminated. 
Wright ultimately responded to his termination byfiling a 
civil action against Montgomery County, the county 
commissioners as a group, and the three commissioners 
who served on the Salary Board -- Mario Mele, Richard S. 




1. The Salary Board consisted of three County Commissioners and the 
County Controller. 
 
2. Defendants Maillie Falconiero and Co. and George Falconiero are not 
County Commissioners and are not parties to this appeal. 
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Wright's complaint included a wide range of claims. In 
Count One, he alleged that the Appellants discriminated 
against, retaliated against, and harassed him on account of 
his race. He based this Count on 42 U.S.C. SS 1981, 1982, 
1983, 1985(1-3), 1986, and 1988, but did not invoke Title 
VII. The remaining counts alleged a litany of state-law 
claims ranging from defamation to intentional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, as well as a variety of other 
tort claims. 
 
In September 1998, the Appellants filed three separate 
motions for summary judgment based on: (1) claims of 
absolute and qualified immunity; (2) flaws in Wright's state- 
law claims; and (3) flaws in Wright's constitutional claims. 
In a December 22, 1998 Memorandum and Order, the 
District Court granted the unopposed motion to dismiss the 
state-law claims. See Wright v. Montgomery County, No. 96- 
CV-4597 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1998). In the same 
Memorandum and Order, the court erroneously 
characterized Count One of Wright's complaint as asserting 
claims under Title VII. See id., slip op. at 5-8. Finding that 
Wright had established a prima facie case of discrimination 
under Title VII, the court denied the Appellants' motion for 
summary judgment on Count One. 
 
Because the District Court had characterized Count One, 
now the only surviving count, as asserting claims under 
Title VII, the Appellants filed a fourth motion for summary 
judgment on January 28, 1999. This time, the Appellants 
argued that summary judgment was proper because Wright 
had failed "to exhaust his legally mandated administrative 
remedies as a condition precedent of commencing suit." 
App. at 1364a. Thereafter, Wright informed the court that 
the federal claims asserted in Count One of his complaint 
were not based on Title VII, but rather on, inter alia, 42 
U.S.C. S 1981. See A1389. The Appellants responded by 
filing yet another motion for summary judgment on 
February 16, asserting various grounds for summary 
judgment, and again asserting absolute immunity. See 
A1393-96 (motion); 1450-51 (Memorandum of Law). 
Subsequently, on February 19, the Appellants filed a 
motion to dismiss based on allegations that Wright was 
refusing to cooperate in discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. 
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On March 15, the District Court filed a second 
Memorandum and Order. Therein, the court corrected 
itself, noting that Wright's claims in Count One were not 
based on Title VII, but rather, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. S 1981. 
See Wright v. Montgomery County, No. 96-CV-4597, 1999 
WL 145205, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1999). In this second 
order, the court dismissed all claims asserted in Count One 
except Wright's retaliation claims. In the course of doing so, 
the District Court purported to address a number of 
motions, including the Appellants' January 28th motion for 
summary judgment based on exhaustion. The court did not 
address the January 28th motion's immunity claims, 
however, nor did it acknowledge the subsequent February 
16th motion reasserting those claims. 
 
On April 29, 1999, the District Court set the case for trial 
on May 10. Appellants filed their first notice of appeal on 
May 7. On that day, the District Court entered a number of 
orders disposing of the parties' remaining motions, 
including, apparently, Appellants' February 16th motion for 
summary judgment. Once more, however, the court did not 
address the Appellants' immunity claims. Instead, the court 
merely noted in a footnote that it had "already addressed 
the issues raised in this motion for summary judgment" in 
its March 15th Memorandum and Order. In response, 
Appellants filed an amended notice of appeal on May 11, 
indicating that they were also appealing from the May 7 
Order.3 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
Absolute immunity is a purely legal question over which 
we exercise plenary review. See Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 
96, 99 (3d Cir. 1996). Our review of the Appellants' 
qualified immunity claims is strictly limited to the legal 
questions involved. Therefore, our review of that issue is 
also plenary. See Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 145 (3d 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2393 (1999). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In addition to this appeal, Appellants filed a Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus, asking us to order the District Court to address the 
immunity issue. Because we determine that the issues are properly 
before us, we will deny the Petition by separate order. 
 




The Appellants raise a number of issues in this appeal. 
As a threshold matter, we must first determine which of 
those issues, if any, we have jurisdiction to review. We 
conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider the 
Appellants' claims to absolute and qualified immunity, but 
lack jurisdiction to consider their remaining claims. We 
next consider whether the District Court erred by implicitly 





1. Timeliness of Appeal 
 
Wright contends that we lack jurisdiction to review the 
Appellants' claims because they failed to file notice of 
appeal within the 30-day limit established by Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 4(a). See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). We 
disagree. 
 
The Rule 4(a) deadline for civil cases applies to"all 
appealable orders, including collateral orders, specifically 
orders denying immunity." Weir v. Propst, 915 F.2d 283, 
286 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Kenyatta v. Moore , 744 F.2d 
1179, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 1984). In Weir, the court held that, 
"[i]f the deadline is missed, the order is not appealable. The 
defendant must then wait until another appealable order 
(normally, the final judgment) is entered, upon appeal of 
which he can challenge any interlocutory order that has not 
become moot." Weir, 915 F.2d at 286. 
 
Wright argues that this appeal should be deemed as 
arising from, at the latest, the District Court's March 15th 
Order denying the Appellants' various motions for summary 
judgment. That argument overlooks one critical fact, 
however. The District Court did not explicitly rule on the 
Appellants' immunity claims in its March 15th Order, nor 
at any time before or after. In its December 22, 1998 Order, 
the court characterized Wright's federal claims as arising 
under Title VII. This, of course, temporarily took the 
immunity issues out of contention. Under Title VII, a public 
official may be held liable in her official capacity only, 
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making the doctrine of qualified immunity, which protects 
only against personal liability, inapplicable. See Harvey v. 
Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Because the 
doctrine of qualified immunity protects a public official from 
liability for money damages in her individual capacity only, 
the doctrine is inapplicable in the Title VII context."). When 
the District Court corrected itself in its March 15th Order, 
the original motion for summary judgment on immunity 
grounds was still properly before it. 
 
The Appellants were entitled to believe that the District 
Court would eventually address their immunity claims at 
least until the court had denied all of their outstanding 
motions and set the case for trial. The District Court set the 
case for trial on April 29, and denied all of the Appellants' 
outstanding motions on May 7. The Appellants clearlyfiled 
their May 7th notice of appeal, as well as their May 11th 
amended notice of appeal, within 30 days of those dates, 
and thus within Rule 4(a)'s time limit. Accordingly, we 
reject Wright's argument that we must dismiss the 
Appellants' appeal as untimely. 
 
2. Jurisdiction over an Interlocutory Appeal  
 
Wright also raises an alternative challenge to our 
jurisdiction over this appeal. He argues that the Appellants' 
claims to qualified immunity do not fit within the collateral- 
order doctrine. We find his arguments on this point 
unpersuasive, however. Moreover, Wright ignores or 
overlooks the fact that the Appellants have also asserted a 
claim to, and appeal from the denial of, absolute immunity. 
 
As a general rule, the federal appellate courts have no 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 to review interlocutory 
decisions such as a denial of summary judgment. 
Nevertheless, the collateral-order doctrine excepts a narrow 
range of interlocutory decisions from the general rule. See 
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
To fall within the doctrine, an interlocutory decision must 
conclusively determine the disputed issue, the issue must 
be completely separate from the merits of the action, and 
the decision must be effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from a final judgment. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the collateral- 
order doctrine to hold that orders denying absolute 
immunity are reviewable on interlocutory appeal. See, e.g., 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982) 
(finding appellate jurisdiction over denial of president's 
claim to absolute immunity); Helstoski v. Meanor , 442 U.S. 
500 (1979) (reviewing claim of immunity under Speech and 
Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 
(1977) (reviewing claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy 
Clause); see also Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 98-99 (3d 
Cir. 1996). In doing so, the Court has explained that 
absolute immunity creates not only protection from liability, 
but also a right not to stand trial. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985). If required to await final 
judgment on the merits of the underlying action before 
seeking appellate review, the appellant would irretrievably 
lose the right not to stand trial in the first place. See id. 
Thus, interlocutory review of the Appellants' absolute 
immunity claims is necessary to preserve the protections 
such immunity affords. 
 
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court extended the collateral- 
order doctrine to include denial of claims to qualified 
immunity. See id.; see also Brown v. United States, 851 
F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, denial of 
qualified immunity falls within the collateral-order doctrine 
only to the extent the denial turns on an issue of law. See 
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995); see also Grant 
v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1996) 
("To the extent they turn on an issue of law , decisions 
denying public officials qualified immunity are considered 
final under the collateral order doctrine.") (emphasis 
added). Generally, the relevant issue of law is whether the 
right the defendant is alleged to have violated was"clearly 
established" at the time the defendant acted or failed to act. 
See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996). Where, 
however, denial turns on the sufficiency of the evidence, it 
may not be appealed until the district court entersfinal 
judgment in the case. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313. 
 
Wright argues that the Appellants' qualified immunity 
claims are not reviewable on interlocutory appeal because 
the District Court's December 18, 1998, Memorandum and 
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Order "sets forth the clearly established right which the 
Appellants violated and therefore denied them the 
protection of qualified immunity." Appellee's Br. at 13 
(citing App. at 1779a). But this argument demonstrates a 
complete failure to understand the collateral-order doctrine, 
as well as the nature of our review. Had the District Court 
actually ruled that Wright had alleged a violation of a 
clearly established right, that would be exactly the type of 
ruling we would have jurisdiction to review on interlocutory 
appeal. 
 
The fact is, however, the District Court never rendered 
any such ruling, nor addressed the Appellants' immunity 
claims in any manner. Indeed, although the court began its 
December 18th Memorandum and Order by stating that it 
was addressing, among other things, Appellants'"Motion 
for Summary Judgment Concerning Their Immunity," the 
court did not analyze the immunity issue, and instead 
limited its discussion to the viability of Wright's substantive 
claims. In its March 15th Memorandum and Order, the 
court again addressed the substantive issues only. 
 
Because the District Court never explicitly addressed the 
Appellants' immunity claims, we must decide whether we 
have interlocutory jurisdiction to review an implied denial 
of those claims. We join the other Circuit Courts of Appeals 
that have addressed this issue and hold that we do. See 
Lowe v. Town of Fairland, 143 F.3d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir. 
1998); Zayas-Green v. Casaine, 906 F.2d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 
1990); Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 741 (2d Cir. 
1988); Craft v. Wipf, 810 F.2d 170, 173 (8th Cir. 1987); 
Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(per curiam); see also Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 
146-147 (3d Cir. 1997) (suggesting interlocutory 
jurisdiction might exist where denial of qualified immunity 
claim can be inferred); Ryan v. Burlington County, 860 F.2d 
1199, 1203 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a district court's 
"order is `final' and immediately reviewable under Mitchell if 
[the appellants] properly raised a claim of qualified 
immunity in the District Court."). Allowing this case to 
proceed to trial without considering the Appellants' 
immunity claims would irreversibly deprive them of any 
right to avoid trial. 
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Of course, the fact that we have jurisdiction to review the 
Appellants' immunity claims does not automatically mean 
that we should also decide them. Some courts confronted 
with this situation have simply remanded the case for the 
district court to rule on the claims in the first instance. 
See, e.g., Musso, 836 F.2d at 742; Craft v. Wipf, 810 F.2d 
at 173; Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d at 1017. Without 
establishing a fixed rule, we conclude that remand on the 
immunity claims would not be appropriate given the 
particular circumstances of this case. 
 
The Supreme Court's decisions in this area make it clear 
that an immune official's right to avoid trial is based not on 
the individual's desire to avoid the personal costs and 
aggravations of presenting a defense. Rather, the right not 
to stand trial is based on far broader concerns for avoiding 
the social costs of the underlying litigation, and for 
ensuring and preserving the effectiveness of government. 
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). The 
concern is that, absent immunity from suit as well as 
liability, the attention of public officials will be diverted 
from important public issues. Additionally, qualified 
individuals might avoid public service altogether, while the 
threat of litigation may undermine the willingness of those 
who do serve to act when action is necessary. See id. at 
814. 
 
The Appellants in this case have already been distracted 
for nearly four years by the need to defend themselves in 
this action. They have presented the District Court with 
numerous motions, including multiple assertions of their 
claims to immunity from suit. They have received and 
responded to the District Court's disposition of those 
motions, energetically pursued an appeal in this court, and 
awaited our decision. Where, as here, the issues are purely 
legal and ripe for review, we see little benefit in requiring 
these Appellants to press their claims anew in the District 
Court, and to risk yet further delay should that court's 
ultimate decision lead to a subsequent appeal. 
 
3. Jurisdiction Over Remaining Issues 
 
In addition to their claims of absolute and qualified 
immunity, the Appellants ask us to dismiss Wright's race- 
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based retaliation claims, asserted under S 1981, on three 
alternative grounds. First, they argue that Wright'sS 1981 
claim must be dismissed because he has admitted that 
three of the four Salary Board members who voted to 
terminate him did not act with improper motive. See 
Appellants' Br. at 42-45. To hold the County or the 
Commissioners liable, they contend, Wright must prove 
that a majority of the Salary Board members "voted to 
terminate Plaintiff for the improper purpose of retaliating 
against him for protesting mistreatment because he is 
black." Id. at 42 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 
Appellants next argue that we must dismiss Wright's 
S 1981 claim because he cannot establish a prima facie 
case of retaliation under that statute. See id.  at 45. More 
specifically, they argue that Wright cannot, as a matter of 
law, demonstrate that the activity for which the Appellants 
allegedly retaliated was a "protected" activity. See id. at 46. 
They similarly argue that Wright cannot establish a causal 
link between the activity in question and his subsequent 
termination. See id. at 48. Finally, the Appellants argue 
that even if Wright could establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation, they have presented "multiple legitimate, non- 
discriminatory reasons for [his] termination." Id. 
 
We express no opinion on the merits of these arguments. 
Unlike absolute and qualified immunity, Appellants' 
remaining claims do not fall within the collateral-order 
doctrine. Indeed, they do not satisfy any of the doctrine's 
three requirements. See Transtech Indus., Inc., v. A&Z 
Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51, 55 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). The District 
Court's denial of their motion for summary judgment has 
not conclusively resolved the issues the Appellants raise on 
appeal. Those issues are not completely separable from the 
merits of the action. And, finally, they will not effectively be 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 
Consequently, the collateral-order doctrine confers no 
jurisdiction to consider Appellants' non-immunity based 
claims on interlocutory appeal. 
 
The Appellants suggest that we have discretion to 
consider their additional claims under pendent appellate 
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jurisdiction. In fact, we have previously recognized a 
discretionary, though "narrow," doctrine of pendent 
appellate jurisdiction. See United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d 
284, 287 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). But we have also 
concluded that the doctrine should be used "sparingly," 
and only where there is a sufficient overlap in the facts 
relevant to both the appealable and nonappealable issues 
to warrant plenary review. See id. We have also stated that 
" `pendent appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise 
unappealable order is available only to the extent necessary 
to ensure meaningful review of an appealable order.' " 
National Union Fire Ins. v. City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 
382 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson 
& Co., 903 F.2d 186, 209 (3d Cir. 1990)); see also Swint v. 
Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35 44-50 (1995) 
(cautioning against an expansive application of pendent 
appellate jurisdiction, and overturning the Eleventh 
Circuit's decision to review a county commission's 
summary judgment motion as pendent to its review of the 
qualified immunity claims asserted by individual 
defendants). 
 
In this case, the Appellants' non-immunity claims depend 
on questions of fact that the District Court has yet to 
resolve. Consequently, plenary review of those claims would 
be inappropriate. Additionally, the Appellants' immunity 
claims are entirely susceptible to meaningful review without 
any consideration of their non-immunity claims. 
Accordingly, we decline to exercise pendent appellate 
jurisdiction over the non-immunity claims. 
 
B. The Immunity Claims 
 
1. Absolute Immunity 
 
The Appellants claim that they are entitled to absolute 
immunity from suit. Their decision to terminate Wright, 
they argue, is "precisely" the type of policy-making decision 
the Supreme Court has held to be " `in the sphere of 
legitimate legislative activity' and entitled to absolute 
immunity." Appellants' Br. at 29 (quoting Bogan v. Scott- 
Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1998)). We disagree. 
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It is true that local legislators, like federal and state 
legislators, are absolutely immune from liability for their 
legislative activities. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 49; see also 
Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983). To be 
legislative, however, the act in question must be both 
substantively and procedurally legislative in nature. See 
Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1996). An act 
is substantively legislative if it involves "policy-making of a 
general purpose" or "line-drawing." Id.  It is procedurally 
legislative if it is undertaken "by means of established 
legislative procedures." Id. 
 
The Appellants' decision to terminate Wright fails the 
substantively-legislative test. The decision did not involve a 
matter of general policy, applicable to a variety of 
circumstances, nor to a range of County employees. Quite 
to the contrary, the decision targeted a particular employee 
suspected of specific acts of mis- and malfeasance. Urging 
the opposite conclusion, the Appellants argue that their 
decision to terminate Wright is analogous to the decision 
held to be legislative in Bogan. Even a passing review of the 
Supreme Court's decision in that case belies the argument, 
however. 
 
In Bogan, the act at issue involved the elimination of the 
plaintiff 's position as part of a larger, city-wide downsizing 
prompted by declining financial resources. See Bogan, 523 
U.S. at 46; see also Aitchison, 708 F.2d at 97 (holding that 
borough council members who voted to abolish assistant 
building inspector position on efficiency and economy 
grounds had absolute immunity from S 1983 claims 
brought by employee who held the position). This case, in 
contrast, involves a decision to eliminate a particular 
employee rather than the position that employee happens 
to hold. Indeed, as the Court expressly noted in Bogan, the 
act at issue in that case 
 
       reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision 
       implicating the budgetary priorities of the city and the 
       services the city provides to its constituents. Moreover, 
       it involved the termination of a position, which, unlike 
       the hiring or firing of a particular employee, may have 
       prospective implications that reach well beyond the 
       particular occupant of the office. 
 
                                13 
  
Brogan, 523 U.S. at 55-56 (emphasis added). 
 
In short, we need not consider whether the act offiring 
Wright by vote of the Salary Board was procedurally 
legislative. Regardless of the procedure, the act was not 
legislative in substance. Firing a particular employee is a 
personnel decision that does not involve general policy 
making. Appellants' firing of Wright did not reach beyond 
"the particular occupant of the office." Nor was their action 
an "integral step[ ] in the legislative process." Id. Actions of 
an executive or administrative nature such as this are not 
entitled to absolute immunity. See Carver, 102 F.3d at 100. 
As a result, Appellants' reliance on Bogan is misplaced and 
their claim of absolute immunity must be denied. 
 
2. Qualified Immunity 
 
Appellants claim that in addition to absolute immunity, 
they are also entitled to qualified immunity. As they 
correctly note, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields 
government officials from personal liability to the extent the 
conduct at issue "does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known." See Appellants' Br. at 37 (citing 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
Unfortunately, the Appellants' attempt to establish that 
their decision to terminate Wright did not violate a clearly 
established right wholly misunderstands the limited nature 
of our interlocutory review. 
 
The Appellants contend that their decision to terminate 
Wright was based on HUD's audit report, which suggested, 
at best, that he was a poor manager, and, at worst, that he 
was guilty of potentially criminal conflicts of interest. They 
further contend that their reliance on the report, whether 
or not mistaken, was not unreasonable under the 
circumstances. They conclude, therefore, that because 
Wright "cannot demonstrate that the individual Defendants 
were `plainly incompetent' or `knowingly violating the law' 
when they terminated him, [his] claims . . . must be 
dismissed on grounds of qualified immunity." Appellants' 
Br. at 42. As we have already suggested, the argument is 
misplaced. 
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Wright has not alleged that the Appellants' reliance on 
the audit report was unreasonable. Quite to the contrary, 
he alleges that the Appellants' claimed reliance on the 
report is merely a pretext. The Appellants terminated him, 
Wright alleges, in retaliation for speaking out against the 
County's allegedly racially discriminatory employment 
practices. There is no question that such racially-based 
retaliation would violate a right that was clearly established 
at the time Wright was terminated.4 See, e.g., Liotta v. 
National Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903, 907 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(holding that appellant had submitted sufficient evidence of 
race-based retaliation to survive summary judgment on his 
S 1981 claim), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); Patrick v. 
Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that six cited cases "were sufficient to inform a reasonable 
government official in 1988" that racially based retaliatory 
actions "may violate the employee's rights as enumerated in 
S 1981."). 
 
Whether the Appellants' decision to terminate Wright was 
made in response to HUD's audit findings as they claim, or 
in retaliation as Wright alleges, is a question of fact to be 
decided in the District Court. Our review on interlocutory 
appeal is strictly limited to determining whether the right 
alleged to have been violated was clearly established at the 
time of the act in question. Until the District Court has 
entered a final judgment, we do not consider whether the 
plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to prove his 
allegations. Holding as we do that Wright has alleged the 
violation of a clearly established right, we must also hold 
that the Appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity at 




For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court's 
implicit denial of Appellants' immunity claims. We decline 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Appellants cite Swineford v. Snyder County Pa., 15 F.3d 1258, 1271 
(3d Cir. 1994), for the proposition that "speech intended to air personal 
grievances" is not protected by the First Amendment. That, of course, is 
inapposite to the question of whether retaliation for such speech violates 
42 U.S.C. S 1981. 
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to address the Appellants remaining claims, and will 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
 
A True Copy: 
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